Ideas from 'The Moral Problem' by Michael Smith [1994], by Theme Structure

[found in 'The Moral Problem' by Smith,Michael [Blackwell 1994,0-631-19246-8]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis

23728

Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions

23744

Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough

18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality

23743

Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires

23723

In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism

23735

Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions

23736

A person can have a desire without feeling it

23739

Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us

23738

Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate

23742

If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win

23746

Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person

23724

A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason

23733

Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external

23740

Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions

23745

We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics

23731

'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives

23732

A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics

23729

Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating

23730

'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism

23727

Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence

22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value

23741

Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring?